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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of the deceased person. This dates everywhere from his
death. 9
From a consideration of the many cases construing the
various acts which the legislature has passed on the sub-
ject, we can discern a disposition on the part of the courts
to impose a strict construction on these statutes which do
not create a lien but limit its duration only. If a creditor
is to avail himself of the statutory remedy he must care-
fully follow the procedure set forth in the acts.
Leo F. Dodson
COMMENTING ON THE WEIGHT OF THE EVI-
DENCE AND THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES
IN THE CHARGE TO THE JURY
In the majority of states, usually because of statutory
or constitutional provisions, trial courts are not permitted,
in charging juries, to comment on the facts, or express an
opinion on the weight of the evidence or the credibility of
witnesses.' There the jury prevails as the sole fact find-
ing agency, divorced from all suggestions and leads of the
trial court.2 Any remark made by a judge, whether direct
or indirect, intentional or inadvertent, from which the
jury may infer what his opinion is, as to the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the evidence, or any part of it pertinent to
the issue, is error.3 However, at common law and in Penn-
sylvania it is not error for the trial court in its charge to
the jury to express an opinion on disputed questions of
fact, provided such questions are ultimately left to the jury
for their decision, without any direction as to how they
89Breden v. Agnew, 8 Pa. 233, 236 (1848).
138 Cyc. 1646; Tait v. Murphy, 80 Ala. 440; Randolph v. McCain,
34 Ark. 696; Miller v. Stewart, 24 Cal. 502; Stacy v. Cobbs, 36 Ill.
349; Goss v. Calkins, 162 Mass. 492; Ross v. State, 29 Tex. 499.
2State v. Williams, 31 S. C. 4.
WFuhrman v. Huntsville, 54 Ala. 263; State v. Ah Tong, 7 Nev.
148; State v. Dick. 60 N. C. 440,
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should find the facts.4 Let us examine this latter view in
detail.
According to this view decisions hold that it rests
within the sound discretion of a trial court judge whether
or not to express his opinion concerning the facts in dis-
pute.5 He is not bound to do so, even on request,6 unless
the circumstances are exceptional when it becomes the
duty of the judge to express his opinion of the facts and
guide the minds of the jury to a correct view of the evi-
dence. 7 If the judge deigns to direct the attention of the
jury to any matter affecting the credibility of a witness,8
or to express an opinion as to the tendency of the facts in
evidence,9 his action remains perfectly proper so long as
he leaves the jury at full liberty to decide the facts upon
their own judgment.'0 When, on the other hand, an ex-
pression of opinion is made in such a manner that the jury
may naturally regard it as a direction to them, and as exclud-
ing them from finding the facts for themselves-there being
evidence proper for them to consider, both for and against
such direction-it constitutes reversible error.1  The best
safeguard against such a pitfall is to expressly inform the
jury that they are the exclusive judges of the facts, and are
not bound by the opinion of the court. 12 It seems that no
'Pool v. White, 175 Pa. 459; Heydrick v. Hutchinson, 165 Pa.
208; Bonner v. Herrick, 99 Pa. 320.
5Crotty v. Danbury, 79 Conn. 379; Bruch v. Carter, 32 N. J. L.
554; Sawyer v. Phaley, 33 Vt. 69.
6Phila. etc. Ry. v. Hagan, 47 Pa. 244; Lorain v. Hall, 33 Pa. 270;
Thomas v. Thomas, 21 Pa. 315; Brown v. Campbell, I S. & R. 176.
7 Com. v. Kilpatrick, 31 Pa. 198; Price v. Harnscher, 174 Pa. 73;
Repsher v. Watson, 17 Pa. 365; Leibig v. Steiner, 94 Pa. 466; Bern-
stein v. Walsh, 32 Pa. Super Ct. 392.
8Dale's Appeal, 57 Conn. 127; Brinton v. Walker, 15 Pa. Super.
Ct. 449; Springer v. Stiver, 16 Pa. Super. Ot. 184; Cathcart v. Corn.,
37 Pa. 108.
9 Oyster v. Longnecker, 16 Pa. 269.
'ASpear v. Phila. Ry. Co., 119 Pa. 61; Bonner v. Herrick, 99 Pa.
220; Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424; Delany v. Robinson, 2 Wh. 503.
"Spangler v. Hummer, 3 Penr. & Watts, 370; Oyster v. Long-
necker, 16 Pa. 269i
12Yale v. Seely, 15 Vt, 221; II. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 76 Fed.
517; Sorenson v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 36 Fed. 166.
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matter how clearly erroneous a judge's opinion may be, he
still has the right to comment on the disputed facts.'3
Moreover, very strong expressions of opinion on the facts
are, tolerated; indeed, sometimes, they may be necessary."
For instance, it has been held that the statement in the
charge to the jury, "In the opinion of the court, the de-
fendant is guilty", did not constitute error prejudicial to
the defendant.' 5 Only the case of a very plain error on the
part of the trial judge will cause the supreme court to re-
verse on account of his comments on the balance of the
testimony.16
It is respectfully submitted that Pennsylvania's stand
in the matter is the better one. The jury should be aided
by the trial court in cases of difficulty, and inspired with
confidence in cases of doubt. The Pennsylvania rule sup-
plies the available medium to effect those ends. No more
cogent reason for the rule can be advanced to counteract
the minimized possibilities of abuse of the power under
discussion.
Regis Francis Mahady
RESPONSIBILITY OF PRINCIPAL FOR NEGLIGENT-
LY INFLICTED INJURIES CAUSED BY AGENTS
USE OF UNAUTHORIZED INSTRUMENTALITY
To settle an hitherto undecided point in the law of
master and servant in Pennsylvania was the task of Justice
Maxey of the Supreme Court in the case of TVesolowski v.
John Hancock Life Insurance Company.' The facts of the
case are briefly these: The defendant, an insurance com-
'sLong v. Ramsay, 1 S. & R. 72; Oyster v. Longnecker, 16 Pa.
269.
14Leibig v. Steiner, 94 Pa. 466; Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347.
15Com. v. Clymer, 1 Leh. L. J. 311. See also McCain v. Comm.,
110 Pa. 263; Winther v. Second St. Pass. Ry. Co., 159 Pa. 628.
loSuplee v. Timothy, 124 Pa. 375; 23 W. N. C. 386,
1162 AtL 166 (1932).
